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Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, plaintiff/petitioner, Benchmark, Inc., ("Benchmark11)
petitions the Court to reconsider its summary decision limiting
Benchmark' s damages for Respondent' s breach of lease to six
months rent and $40,000 in remodeling costs.

Benchmark does not

seek rehearing of the Court' s remand of the constructive
eviction issue for trial.

I.

CERTIFICATION

Counsel for Benchmark certify that this Petition is
presented in good faith and not for delay.

II.
1.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 28, 1991, the trial court granted

Benchmark' s Motion for Summary Judgment, finding that
Respondents, as lessees, had breached their lease with
Benchmark, and awarding Benchmark rents through the lease term
as damages.

The trial court dismissed Respondents' constructive

eviction counterclaims.

On August 6, 1991, judgment for

Benchmark was entered.
2.

On August 21, 1991, Respondents appealed the

judgment to the Utah Supreme Court.
3.

On August 30, 1991, Respondents moved for summary

disposition.

Respondents argued that genuine issues of material

fact regarding constructive eviction precluded summary judgment.
Alternatively, Respondents argued that if summary judgment was
-2-

proper, Benchmark' s damages should not exceed six months rent
and $40,000 in remodeling costs.
4.

The Court's December 13, 1991, per curiam opinion

granted Respondents' Motion for Summary Disposition and remanded
the constructive-eviction for trial.

The Court' s opinion went

on to limit Benchmark' s damages to six months rent and no more
than $40,000 of Benchmark's remodeling expenses.
III.

ISSUE PRESENTED

Whether this Court misapprehended the law when it
limited Benchmark' s damages for breach of lease to six months
rent and $40, 000 remodeling costs.
IV.
A,

ARGUMENT

TRIAL OF THE DAMAGES ISSUE IS NECESSARY BECAUSE THE
NOTICE OF TERMINATION PROVISION IS SUBJECT TO TWO
PLAUSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS
In Utah, a contract is ambiguous if it can be

understood to have two or more plausible meanings.

C. J. Realty,

Inc. v. Willev. 758 P. 2d 923, 928 (Utah Ct. App. 1988);
Metropolitan Property & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Finlayson. 751 P. 2d
254, 257 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

Here, the lease's notice of

termination provision1 has at least two plausible meanings.
1

This provision provides that:
Lessee may terminate this lease in advance of
its expiration date by giving the Lessor six
(6) months prior written notice of its
intention to terminate. Lessor agrees that
-3-

Benchmark advanced before the trial court the first meaning,
which is that the limited damages prescribed by the notice
provision do not apply unless "termination by Lessee [is] made
pursuant to [the notice provision]."
(the "Lease") H 18.

August 26, 1986, Lease

The notice provision requires the lessee to

give six-months prior written notice of its intent to terminate.
Only when the lessee gives proper notice is the obligation to
pay rents through the entire lease term obviated.

Proper notice

(terminating "pursuant to" the notice provision) is a condition
precedent to the limitation of damages, as the trial court
apparently agreed.

pny termination fry freggee mafle PVfSWant tP
this paragraph shall extinguish Lessee' s
obligation to make rental payments after
such
termination
date
or
after
Lessee
surrenders
possession
of
the
premises,
whichever occurs later. Should Lessee elect
to terminate this lease for any reason
whatsoever, except for Lessor's failure or
refusal to comply with the terms of the
lease and/or by reason of condemnation or
destruction of the premises, then and in
such event, Lessee is obligated to reimburse
Lessor one sixtieth (1/60) of the documented
remodeling costs for each month remaining on
the lease at the time of termination.
Such
reimbursement,
in any event,
shall not
exceed the total sum of $40,000.00.
August 26, 1986, Lease 11 18 (emphasis added), attached as
Exhibit 5 to Respondents' Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Support of Motion for Summary Disposition ("Respondents'
Memo. •' ).

-4-

Respondents argued a second plausible meaning of the
i iot i ce provi si on

They asserted tha t the terminati on provision

serves as an unrestricted 1 imitation ^n damages.
;

Under this

interpretation, t h e i r ] iabi 1 ity w o u ] d b e r e s t r i c t e d 1:o t h e
- s i o n d a m a g e s e \ e :i: 1 t h o i i g 1: I 11: I e}- a • ::i in. i 1 1 e d 1 y d i d i i o t

g i v e s i x - m o n t h s w r i t t e n n o t i c e of t h e i r i n t e n t
(Respondents'

Memo, pp

9 10; L e a s e f 1 8 ) .

to

terminate,

This Court's

per

Because both of t h e s e c o n t r a c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s

a re

curiam o p i i i:i oi I a d o p t s 1:1 li s ineai i i i lg

plausible^
intended
Realty,

t h e L e a s e i s ambiguous by law and t h e
" ^b° p^r^iep nnipt-

Inc.

/ ** l

meaning

l e t e r m i n e d at t r i a l

<: *•*. -

v ,>:

contract

is

£ t JL_ "
ambiguous

i n 1 e in t mUA 1 to *J

" e x t r i i i s :i
and considerec

*- e; :-„

- --o w h a t t h e p a r t i e s

r(

" •'r *J :|' v e d

actually

agreed to ") (emphasis added); W i l b m Y, Interstate Elec. , 748
P 2d bH<i,
should amend its per curiam opir

~:r

for a determination of uay part J. eg

. **~ - .- * - *- damages issue
lat^ui xu drafting the

notice provision
B.

NOTICE OF TERMINATION MUST BE IN STRICT ACCORDANCE
WITH THE LEASE,
Respondents' brief to this Court implied that f hn

paitjpi,,' i nt rndrJ' >in iimi i .( ' .

u!i«", pri"\isi I'I i

hf»?,iii*- the

point because the damages for Respondents' breach are 1 imited to
- -5

those incurred within the notice period as a matter of law.

As

support, Respondents cite two employment (not landlord/tenant)
cases.

See Respondents' Memo. , p. 10.

Although it is not clear

from the per curiam opinion, the Court apparently relied upon
these employment cases in limiting Respondents' liability.

Such

reliance is misplaced in a landlord/tenant case.
The rule in Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. , 776 P. 2d
896 (Utah 1989) controls.
for breach of the lease.

In Reid, the landlords sued a tenant
The tenant, like Respondents here,

claimed that it was constructively evicted and thus relieved of
its obligation to pay rent.

The landlords prevailed at trial

and were awarded rent through the lease term.

This Court upheld

the trial court' s findings on appeal but remanded the case for a
determination of whether the landlords fulfilled their duty to
mitigate through efforts to relet the premises.
909.

776 P. 2d at

The Reid Court stated that when a tenant breaches the

lease, the landlord may recover rents through the term of the
lease as damages, provided he/she attempts to relet the
premises. L$l.
Although the Reid opinion did not address the effect a
notice-of-termination clause has on the damage calculation,
other jurisdictions have not limited damages in landlord/tenant
cases to those incurred during the notice period where the
tenant, like Respondents, fail to give proper notice of
-6-

termination.

See Deschenes v. Congel, 149 Vt. 579, 547 A. 2d

1344 (1988)(lessee's notice of termination must be in strict
compliance with lease to be effective); National Alfalfa
Dehydrating & Milling Co. v. 4010 Washington, Inc. , 434 S. W. 2d
757 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968)(when right to cancel lease is
conditioned upon giving six months notice, lessee must strictly
comply before notice is effective); A. Dubois & Son v. Goldsmith
Bros. , 273 App. Div. 306, 77 N. Y. S. 2d 473 (1948) (right to
terminate lease must be exercised within the time expressly
provided).
The lessor in Deschenes, like Benchmark, sued the
lessee for past rents and damages.

Under the lease, the lessee

could terminate the lease by giving thirty-days prior written
notice and payment of rent to the date of termination.

The

lessee gave written notice of his intent to terminate the lease
without complying with the notice provision' s requirement to
state the date of termination.

The lessee then vacated the

premises without paying rent for the thirty-day notice period.
Analyzing the termination provision, the Deschenes Court held
that "when a lease expresses an agreement with regard to notice
of termination, the time, mode, and manner of such notice must
conform to the agreement."

547 A. 2d at 1346.

Because the

lessee gave defective notice and failed to pay the required

-7-

rents, the court held that the lessee was liable for all rents
and taxes due through the entire lease terms.

547 A. 2d at 1347.

Here, Respondents do not dispute that they failed to
give six-months prior written notice to termination.
Respondents' Memo. p. 10.

It is also uncontested that

Respondents failed to pay rents to the date of termination and
the remodeling costs required by the Lease.
even tender such performance.

Respondents did not

Instead, they claim that no

monies are due and no notice of termination is needed because
they were constructively evicted.

See H 8, Respondents' Answer.

Consequently, Benchmark, like the lessor in Deschenes, was
required to seek judicial enforcement of the lease.
Respondents' liability is not limited either by the notice
provision with which they failed to comply2 or by the law, as
they incorrectly claim.
The Respondents' employment cases do not apply.

The

contracts at issue in the employment cases were not leases for
real property, but rather service contracts.

These cases do not

involve the interpretation of a damage clause tied to a
termination notice provision.

Instead, they address the

sufficiency of the employer' s notice and the employee's lost
wages resulting from termination.
2

Shain v. Washington Nat. Ins.

£££ generally, JacKSQIl V. ELsiL 499 P. 2d 279 (Utah
1972)(breaching party cannot claim benefits of lease).
-8-

Co, , 308 F. 2d 611 (8th Cir. 1962); Osborn v. Commanche Cattle
Industries. Inc. , 545 P. 2d 827 (Okl. App. 1975).

Moreover,

there is an understandable difference between the damages rule
applied when a lease is terminated and the employment rule the
Respondents cite.

Notice of termination of an employment

agreement has less impact on damages because wages are paid
contemporaneously with the performance of services.

The

employer does not usually make substantial capital expenditures
for the employee' s benefit prior to the commencement of
employment.

Hence, for purposes of calculating damages, strict

compliance with a notice of termination provision is less
significant in an employment action.
In the landlord/tenant context, however, the landlord
may make costly improvements to the premises for the tenant' s
benefit before the lease term commences.

Here, for example,

Benchmark undisputedly expended $126,184. 30 to improve the
premises before Respondents took possession.

Affidavit of Lynn

Michelsen, March 15, 1991, 1 5, attached as Exhibit "A" to the
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment.

Strict compliance to lease terms

is necessary to ensure fairness.

The holdings in Reid. which

Benchmark cited to the Court, and Deschenes (and not the
employment cases Respondents cite) apply in this landlord/tenant
action.
-9-

V.

CONCLUSION

The two plausible meanings of the notice provision-one advanced by Benchmark which the trial court adopted, and one
advanced by Respondents and applied in this Court' s per curiam
opinion—evidence that the notice provision is ambiguous.
Extrinsic evidence should be presented at trial to determine the
parties' intent.

Moreover, landlord/tenant law (unlike the

employment law rule which this Court apparently misapprehended)
required that the Respondents' notice of termination strictly
comply with the Lease before the damage limitation terms
applied.
provision.

The Respondents did not comply with the Lease' s notice
For these reasons, Benchmark respectfully suggests

that the Court misapprehended the law and requests a rehearing
on the damages issue.
DATED this 3&

day of December, 1991.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

T$*mas T. B i l l ^ W g s ^ ^ /
David L. A r r i n g t o j v - ^

^

Bryon J. Beneven£o
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Petitioner
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy
of the within and foregoing PETITION FOR REHEARING to be handdelivered this \>°

day of December, 1991, to the following:

Joseph C. Rust, Esq.
Kesler & Rust
Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street, #2000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

John M. Wunderli, Esq.
4525 South Wasatch Blvd., #335
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
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